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This paper incorporates the interdisciplinary New Institutional Economics in a comprehensive 
framework for analyzing risk management in the agri-food sector. First, it specifies the diverse types 
of agri-food risks (natural, technical, behavioral, economic, policy, etc.)  and the modes of their man-
agement (market, private, public, and hybrid). Second, it defines the efficiency of risk management 
and identifies the factors (personal, institutional, dimensional, technological, and natural) of gover-
nance choice. Next, it presents stages in the analysis of risk management and the improvement of 
public intervention in the governance of risk. Finally, it identifies the contemporary opportunities 
and challenges for risk governance in the agri-food chain.
Introduction 
The  management  of  diverse  risks  (natural,  market, 
criminal, policy, etc.) in the agrarian and food sec-
tors are issues with particular topical interest (Bab-
cock,  2004;  CIPS,  2012;  Deep  &  Dani,  2009;  EU, 
2011; Notarnicolaa et al., 2012; OECD, 2008; Olsson 
& Skjöldebrand, 2008; Ramaswami et al., 2008; RP-
DRM, 2012; Schaffnit-Chatterjee, 2010; Shepherd et 
al., 2006; Trench et al., 2011; Tummala & Schoenherr, 
2011; Weaver & Kim, 2000). Evolving uncertainty, 
risks and crises associated with the progression of nat-
ural environments, products, and technologies, social 
demands, policies, and globalization present new chal-
lenges to the current systems of risk management. 
Risk  management  studies  in  the  agri-food  sector 
predominately  focus  on  technical  methods  and  ca-
pabilities to perceive, prevent, mitigate, and recover 
from diverse threats and risks (Barker, 2005; Beni et 
al., 2012; DTRA & IIBR, 2011; Hefnawy, 2011; Jaffee 
et al., 2008; Luning et al., 2006; Zhang & Li, 2012). 
Most economic publications apply a Neoclassical ap-
proach, study risks as commodities regulated by mar-
ket supply and demand, and model farmers’ “willing-
ness to pay” for insurance contracts relative to agents’ 
risk aversion, risk probabilities, and the magnitude of 
damages  (Gerasymenko & Zhemoyda, 2009; OECD, 
2011). Market and private failures are acknowledged, 
and needs for public intervention in agrarian insurance 
are increasingly recognized (Brewer, 2010; EU, 2011; 
OECD, 2008). 
Risk management analysis largely ignores significant 
risks based on “human nature” (bounded rationality, 
opportunism), critical factors for managerial decision 
making such as institutional environment and transac-
tion costs, and diverse alternative modes of manage-
ment (market, private, collective, public). As a result, the 
efficiency and complementarities of risk management 
modes cannot be assessed properly. Despite advances 
in risk management technologies and “menus” of risk 
reduction, mitigation and coping strategies, numerous 
failures/challenges (production, safety, environmental, 
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etc.) persist in the agri-food sector (Dani and Deep, 
2010;  EU,  2011;  Humphrey  and  Memedovic,  2006; 
Luning et al., 2006; OECD, 2011; Sarkar et al., 2012). 
Consequently, attention is directed to the system of gov-
ernance that eventually determines the exploration of 
technological opportunities and the state of agri-food 
security (Bacha et al., 2009; Bachev, 2010). 
This paper incorporates interdisciplinary New Insti-
tutional Economics (Coase, 1960; Furuboth and Rich-
ter, 1998; North, 1990; Williamson, 1981; 1996) in 
a comprehensive framework for analyzing risk man-
agement in the agri-food sector.  First, it specifies the 
types of agri-food risks and the modes of their man-
agement. Second, it defines the efficiency of risk man-
agement and identifies factors of governance choice. 
Next, it presents the stages in risk management analy-
sis and improvements of public intervention. Finally, it 
identifies contemporary opportunities and challenges 
for risk governance in the agri-food chain. 
1. Agri-food risks and modes of 
governance
Risk  is  any  current  or  future  hazard  (event)  with  a 
significant negative impact(s). It is either idiosyncratic 
(accidental, low probability, unpredictable events) or 
systematic (high probability, “predictable” events). The 
risk/threat could be of natural (adverse weather, insect-
related, catastrophes), technological (“pure” technical 
failures), or human (individual or collective actions/
inactions), or a combination of these types. Individual 
behavior and actions that cause risks include agent’s 
ignorance (lack of knowledge, information, training) 
and/or  errors;  risk-taking  strategy  (accepting  above 
“normal” risk); mismanagement (inadequate planning, 
prevention,  recovery);  opportunistic  behavior  (pre-
contractual  cheating,  post-contractual  “moral  haz-
ard”); criminal acts (damaging/stealing or invading an 
individual’s property); terrorist attacks (environmental 
contamination or other actions that aim to produce 
“mass  terror”),  etc.  Collective  actions  are  sources  of 
risks that relate to: economic dynamics and uncertainty 
(changing demands, price volatility, competition, mar-
ket “failures” and imbalances such as “lack” of labor, 
credit, inputs); collective orders (professional standards, 
strikes, trade and community rules and restrictions); 
or public orders (political instability and uncertainty, 
evolution in informal and formal norms, public “fail-
ures” such as bad, delayed, or under/over intervention, 
law and contract enforcements, mismanagement, “in-
efficiency by design”), etc. 
The agri-food sector can face risks associated with 
each component (dairy farms, food processors, trad- (dairy farms, food processors, trad- dairy farms, food processors, trad-
ers) or it could cause risks (risk from farming, from 
food processing, from food-distribution). Risk can be 
internal to agri-food chains such as hazards caused by 
one element affecting another within the sector. Risk 
can be external and associated with external factors 
(natural  environment,  government  policy,  interna-
tional  trade)  and/or  effecting  external  components 
(consumers, residents, industries, nature). Risk can 
be private, when it is assumed by individuals, collec-
tives, entities, or industries, or it can be public when 
it affects large groups, communities, consumers, or 
future generations. 
The magnitude of risk is large when an event has 
both a great likelihood of occurrence and substantial 
negative consequences - such as damage to humans and 
livestock (health and property), inferior yields and in-
come, loss of market position, food and environmental 
contamination, etc. When risk is considerable, it would 
likely be associated with significant costs that often can 
hardly be expressed in monetary terms - human health 
hazards, degraded soil, and loss of biodiversity and 
eco-system services. Thus, “rational” agents that maxi-
mize their own welfare will be interested in investing in 
risk prevention and reduction.
In  a  narrow  (technical)  sense,  risk  management 
comprises individual, collective and public action(s) 
for reducing/eliminating risk and its consequences. In 
a broader sense, risk management is the specific sys-
tem of social order (governance) that is responsible 
for the particular behavior(s) of agents and determin-
ing way(s) to assign, protect, exchange, coordinate, 
stimulate,  and  dispute  risks,  rights,  resources,  and 
activities (Bachev and Nanseki, 2008). In a particular 
(socio-economic, technological, natural) environment, 
the specific system of risk governance that is “put in 
place” is intimately responsible for the efficiency of 
the detection, prevention, mitigation, and reduction of 
threats/risks and their consequences. 
Generic forms and mechanisms of risk governance 
are (Figure 1) as follows: 
Private modes (“private and collective order”) in-
clude diverse private initiatives and special contractual Vizja Press&IT www.ce.vizja.pl
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and organizational arrangements tailored to the features 
of risks and agents, such as codes of behavior, diverse 
(relational, security, future) contracts, cooperatives, as-
sociations, business ventures, etc. Market modes (“in-
visible hand of market”) include various decentralized 
initiatives governed by free market price movements 
and competition, such as risk trading (selling/buying 
insurance),  future  contracts  and  options,  production/
trade of special (organic, fair-trade, origins) products, 
etc.  Public  modes  (“public  order”)  include  various 
forms of third-party public (government, international) 
intervention in market and private sectors, such as pub-
lic information, regulations, bans, assistance, funding, 
assurance, taxation, provision, etc. 
Sometimes, risk management can be conducted ef-  be conducted ef-  conducted ef-
fectively though “self-management” such as production 
management, adaptation to industry and formal stan-
dards, “self-insurance” though stock investments, finan-
cial reserves, etc. Primitive forms of on-farm risk man-
agement through production management improvement 
are widespread: control and security enhancement, use 
of appropriate crop varieties (resistance to pests, diseases, 
and weather), structure of technology and production, 
product diversification, dislocation, etc. Similarly, off-
farm enterprise/income diversification is a major risk 
management strategy for most European farms (Bachev 
and Tanic, 2011). Very often, risk management requires 
an effective governance  of relations  with other agents 
such  as  the  exchange  and  regulations  of  rights,  the 
alignment of conflicts, the coalition of resources, and 
collective or public actions on regional, national, and 
transnational scales. Thus, a risk could be “managed” 
through market modes (purchase of insurance, hedging 
with future price contingency contracts), private modes 
(contractual or literal integration, cooperation), public 
forms  (state  regulation,  guarantee,  compensation),  or 
hybrid combinations of other forms.  
2. Risk management efficiency
Risk governance modes have different efficiencies be- ies be-  be- be-
cause they have dissimilar potentials to reduce the like- the like-
lihood and impact of risks and involve different costs 
(Bachev, 2010). Market or collective governance has 
advantages over internal mode/“own protection” be-  over internal mode/“own protection” be- /“own protection” be- own protection” be- ” be-  be- be-
cause market governance allows for the exploration of 
economies of scale/scope in preventing risks and man- /scope in preventing risks and man- scope in preventing risks and man- preventing risks and man- risks and man- s and man-  and man- man-
aging  negative  consequences.  However,  risk  trading 
or  sharing  is  associated  frequently  with  significant 
transaction costs for finding the best partners and pric- the best partners and pric- best partners and pric-  and pric-  pric- pric-
es, formulating/disputing terms of exchange, forming 
coalitions, and safeguarding against new risks from the 
opportunistic behavior of counterparts/partners. Con-  behavior of counterparts/partners. Con- of counterparts/partners. Con- . Con-  Con-
sequently, markets and private sectors “fail” to effective-
ly manage the existing/likely risks, and there is a need 
for “state intervention” in risk management (coopera-
tion and assistance for farmers, public cost-sharing or 
provisions,  mandatory  assurance  regulation).  Thus, 
“governance matters” and applying proper risk man- applying proper risk man-  proper risk man- proper risk man- roper risk man- man-
agement structure are important parts of the process 
of optimization (effective allocation) of resources. 
Following  Coase’s  logic  (1960),  if  property  rights 
were  well-defined  and  transaction  costs  were  zero, 
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then all risks would be managed in the most socially 
efficient  way,  independent  of  the  specific  mode  of 
governance (although some types of risks would not 
exist  or  be  significant,  e.g.,  risks  related  to  adverse 
human  behavior).  Then,  agents  would  either  sell 
their  risk  to specialized  market  agents  or  safeguard 
against  risk  through  private  contract  terms  or  join 
risk-sharing organizations of interested parties. Risk-
taking would be distributed (exchanged, shared) by 
agents according to their will, while total costs for risk 
prevention, assurance, reduction, and recovery would 
be minimized. The rational choice for an individual 
agent would be to eliminate significant risk altogether 
by selling risk to specialized market risk-takers. Mar-  selling risk to specialized market risk-takers. Mar- ing risk to specialized market risk-takers. Mar-  risk to specialized market risk-takers. Mar- specialized market risk-takers. Mar-  market risk-takers. Mar- -takers. Mar- takers. Mar- s. Mar- . Mar- Mar- ar-
ket governance would optimize risk-taking, minimize 
“technological costs” for risk assurance and explore the 
recovery potential for economies of size/scope at na- potential for economies of size/scope at na- ize/scope at na- scope at na-  at na-
tional/transnational scales. 
When  property  rights  are  not  well-defined  or 
enforced and transaction costs (associated with distri-  (associated with distri-
bution, protection, and exchange of rights of individu-
als, groups, and generations) are high, then the type of 
governance is essential to cover the extent and costs of 
risk protection. For example, the internal (ownership) 
mode is often preferred over outside (market, contract) 
modes because of the comparative protective and costs 
advantages for “standard” natural/behavioral risk man- “standard” natural/behavioral risk man- standard” natural/behavioral risk man- ” natural/behavioral risk man-  natural/behavioral risk man- /behavioral risk man- behavioral risk man- man-
agement. Frequently, enormous transaction costs can 
block  the  development  of  insurance  markets  or  the 
emergence of mutually benefi  cial risk-sharing organiza- mutually benefi  cial risk-sharing organiza-  beneficial risk-sharing organiza- organiza-
tions. For instance, despite “common” interests and huge 
risk minimization potentials, collective risk-sharing or-
ganizations are rarely developed by smallholders.
Formal and informal institutional restrictions might 
make some modes of risk governance impossible. For 
example,  risk-assuring  monopolies/cartel  arrange-   risk-assuring  monopolies/cartel  arrange- -assuring  monopolies/cartel  arrange- assuring  monopolies/cartel  arrange- /cartel  arrange- cartel  arrange- arrange-
ments are illegal in many countries, while most entre-  are illegal in many countries, while most entre- , while most entre-  while most entre- entre-
preneurial risk-taking is endorsed (according to the 
“low risk-low profit” principle). Thus, not all modes 
of risk governance are always feasible in every  socio-
economic setting. However, if the costs of illegitimate 
forms are low, the possibility for disclosure is low and 
enforcement and punishment are insignificant, while 
benefits are considerable, then more effective “gray” or 
black governance prevails.
Individuals differ significantly in their capacity to 
recognize, adopt, and pay for prevention, and manage 
risk. For example, risk-taking farmers prefer risky but 
more productive forms (e.g., bank credit for new, prof-
itable ventures). In addition, agents have quite different 
interests in effective management of particular risk(s) 
because they receive dissimilar benefits and costs from 
risk management.  
There is no single universal form of management 
for diverse types of risks. According to the specific fea-
tures of each risk (origin, probability, likely damages), 
there will be different most effective governance forms. 
For example, while low probability “standard” (natu-
ral, criminal) risk might be effectively governed with 
classical  market  contracts  (purchase  of  insurance), 
most  behavioral  risks  require  special  private  modes 
(branding,  long-term  or  interlink  contracts,  verti-
cal integration), and high damage risk from terrorist 
attracts  necessitates  specialized  public  forms  (intel-
ligence, security enforcement). Hence, depending on 
the type and severity of risk, the interests and personal 
characteristics of individuals, and the specific natural, 
economic and institutional environments, there will be 
different (most) efficient forms of governing a particular 
type of risk. Consequently, some governance mix will 
always  exist  to  manage  the  diverse  risks  associated 
with the agri-food sector.
Sometimes, effective risk management leads to the 
reduction or removal of a particular risk. Oft  en, com-  or removal of a particular risk. Oft  en, com- removal of a particular risk. Oft  en, com- a particular risk. Oft  en, com- articular risk. Oft  en, com- Oft  en, com- ften, com- , com-  com- com-
plete risk elimination is either costly (“unaffordable” 
by individuals/society) or practically impossible (when 
uncertainty and transaction costs are enormous). For 
example, certain natural risks will always exist despite 
the system of management. Moreover, it is practically 
impossible to write “compete” contracts (for trading 
risk) that include all probable future contingencies and 
subsequent rights and obligations for each party (Vi-
erø, 2012; Williamson, 1996), and some transaction 
risk will always remain. Th   erefore, eff  ective risk man- Therefore, effective risk man- man-
agement is always connected with the needs for some 
trade-off  between  benefits  from  reducing  particular 
risks  (saved  costs,  minimized  impacts)  and  related 
costs for risk governance. Thus, some “uncovered” risk 
will normally remain.
Individual  modes  can  offer  effective  protection 
from  different/multiple  risks.  Moreover,  manage- manage-
ment  of  one  type  of  risk  might  be  associated  with 
exposure to a new type of risk/cost, e.g., vertical in-  to a new type of risk/cost, e.g., vertical in- a new type of risk/cost, e.g., vertical in- new type of risk/cost, e.g., vertical in- , e.g., vertical in-
tegration  eliminates  “market  risk”  but  creates  risk Vizja Press&IT www.ce.vizja.pl
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from a partner’s opportunism. The level of (overall) 
risk exposure is typically determined by the “critical” 
(most important) risk, and integral risk rarely equals 
the sum of the individual risks. 
Frequently, there are a number of possible (alter-
native) forms of governance of a particular risk. For 
example, the “risk to the environment” might be man-
aged by voluntary actions of farmers, environmental 
cooperation, private contracts with interested parties, 
assistance  by  third  party  organizations,  public  eco-
contacts, and public regulations. Some forms of risk 
management are practically impossible or socially un-
acceptable, e.g., futures and insurance markets do not 
develop for many types of agro-food risks, and private 
management  is  the  only  option  (Frank  and  Garcia, 
2011); additionally, the management of many eco-risks 
require collective actions at local, eco-system, regional 
or transnational levels (Bachev, 2010; Sutherland et al., 
2012). Many type of risk management are publicly im-
posed, e.g., there is harmonized public management of 
food safety risks in the EU, there are strict regulations 
of Genetically Modified Crops (GMC), the “precau-
tion principle” is mandatory and carried out by states, 
“safety nets” are organized as public projects, etc. 
Therefore,  comparative  analysis  is  to  be  employed 
to evaluate (technically, economically, socially) feasible 
alternatives and select the most efficient one that reduces 
the overall risk to an “acceptable” level and requires the 
minimum total (risk assurance and governance) costs. 
The analysis must include all current and future costs 
associated with risk management, such as the current 
technological and management costs (for adaptation, 
compliance, information, certification), risk insurance 
premiums, contracting and coalition costs, and the long-
term (future) costs for recovering damages, including 
the associated transaction costs (disputes, expertise, low 
suits) for claiming losses. Most risk management analy-
ses ignore the current and likely long-term transaction 
costs associated with risk management.
In any case, the individual, group, community, sec-
toral,  chain,  national  and  international  efficiency  of 
risk  management  must  be  distinguished.  Often,  the 
elimination of risk for one agent induces (new) risk 
for another agent. For example, agri-food price fluc-
tuation causes income risk for producers but benefits 
speculators, and application of chemicals reduces the 
risk for farmers but produces significant negative ef-
fects (water, soil and air contamination) for residents, 
consumers, and affected industries. Furthermore, risk 
management is only a part of the overall governance 
of the diverse (production, consumption, transaction) 
activities  of  agents.  For  example,  most  managerial 
innovations in farming and the agri-food chain are 
driven  by  the  motivation  to  economize  and  reduce 
transaction costs (Sporleder, 1992). Therefore, the total 
efficiency (benefits, disadvantages, cost saving and risk 
minimization potential) of various modes for individ-
ual agents and the public are to be taken into account. 
It is frequently the case that the minimization of risk-
related costs is associated with an increase in produc-
tion or transaction costs and vice versa. Similarly, the 
risk elimination costs of one agent frequently increase 
the security of another agent in the agri-food chain.
According to specific natural and socio-economic 
environments, personal characteristics of individuals, 
and  social  preferences,  various  structures  of  risk 
governance evolve in different sub-sectors, industries, 
supply chains, and societies. At one extreme, the system 
of risk management works well, and only “normal” (en- management works well, and only “normal” (en-  works well, and only “normal” (en- s well, and only “normal” (en-  well, and only “normal” (en- , and only “normal” (en-  and only “normal” (en- “normal” (en- normal” (en- ” (en-  (en- (en-
trepreneurial) risk is left “ungoverned”. In some cases, 
the market fails to provide adequate risk governance, 
but a variety of effective private modes emerge to fill 
the gap. Often, both market and private governance 
fail, but effective public involvement cures the problem. 
Nevertheless,  there  are  situations  when  specific 
institutional and risk management cost structures lead 
to failures of market and private modes, and needed 
public intervention in risk governance. Consequently, 
a complete range of risks is left unmanaged, which has 
adverse effects on the size and sustainability of agri-
food enterprises, market development, the evolution 
of  production  and  consumption,  the  state  of  the 
environment, and social welfare. 
Depending on the costs and the efficiency of the spe-
cific system of governance in a particular (sub)sector, 
region, country, supply chain etc., there will be unlike 
outcomes in terms of “residual” risks and dissimilar states 
and costs of human, food, environmental, etc., security in 
different regions and periods of time (Figure 1). For in-
stance, when there is inefficient public enforcement of 
food, labor, and eco-safety standards (lack of political 
willingness, administrative capability), then enormous 
“gray” agrarian and food sectors develop with inferior, 
hazardous, and counterfeit components.50 Hrabrin Bachev
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3. Factors of governance choice 
The  forms  of  risk  management  depend  on  the  risk 
type,  personal  characteristics,  institutional  environ-
ment, progress in science and technology, culture, so-
cial education and preferences, evolution of the natural 
environment, etc.  (Figure 1). Risk features such as the 
origin, probability of occurrence, likely damages, and 
scale are important factors for the choice of governance. 
For instance, local risk could be managed through pri-
vate  modes,  while  most  market  and  environmental 
risks require collective actions at the regional, national 
or transnational level. For high probability and harm-
ful risks, agents prefer more secure/expensive modes 
such as security investments, purchase of insurance, 
maintaining reserves, taking hostages, and interlinked 
organizations. However, many smallholders cannot af-
ford the related costs and practice no or primitive forms 
of risk management, such as cash-and-carry deals and 
product diversification. In that case, there is the need 
for third party (government, international assistance) 
intervention, though insurance, support, safety nets, 
etc., to decrease the vulnerability of farmers.
Personal and behavioral characteristics of agents 
include  interests,  preferences,  knowledge,  capability, 
risk-aversion,  reputation,  trust,  “contractual”  power, 
and  opportunism.  For  instance,  some  risks  are  not 
perceived  (unknown)  by  private  and  public  agents; 
therefore,  no  risk  management  is  put  in  place.  In 
some cultures, the cooperative is the preferred mode 
of organization; an experienced/trained farmer might 
design and manage a larger organization/hired labor 
and  more  outside  (credit,  insurance,  inputs  supply) 
contracts that are adapted to his needs. Additionally, a 
risk-taking entrepreneur prefers riskier, but more pro-
ductive ventures. 
Behavioral factors such as the bounded rationality 
and opportunisms of individuals are identified as being 
responsible for transaction costs and, thus, for orga-
nizational choice (Williamson, 1996). They are widely 
studied in insurance theory as sources of cheating on 
both sides of contracts (Derrig, 2002). 
Agents do not possess complete information about 
the  economic  system  (risks,  price  ranges/dynamics, 
trade opportunities, policy development) because the 
collection and processing of such information (mul-
tiple markets, future events, intention for cheating) is 
very expensive or impossible. To optimize decision-
making, they allocate resources to “increasing imper-
fect  rationality”  (data  collection,  analyses,  forecasts, 
training, consulting) and select forms (internal orga-
nization, “selling out” risk) that minimize the related 
risks/costs. 
Agents  are  also  prone  to  opportunism,  and  they 
frequently take advantage of opportunities to extract 
extra benefits/rent. If there was no opportunism, only 
risk  that  is  related  to  bounded  rationality  (natural, 
technical) would remain and the consequences would 
be recovered easily with the cooperation and mutual 
benefits (risk sharing) of the parties. Pre-contractual 
opportunism (“adverse selection”) occurs when some 
of the partners use “information asymmetry” to nego-
tiate advantageous contract terms. Post-contractual op-
portunism (“moral hazard”) occurs when a counterpart 
takes advantage of the impossibility of complete obser-
vation of activities (by another partner, third-party) or 
takes “legal advantage” of unforeseen changes in the 
exchange conditions (costs, prices, regulations). Third 
form of opportunism (“free ride”) occurs in large or-
ganizations where individual benefits are not propor-
tional to individual efforts/costs and everyone expects 
other people to invest in the organizational develop-
ment and benefit from the new organization (Olson, 
1969). Bounded rationality often makes it costly/im-
possible to distinguish opportunistic from non-oppor-
tunistic behavior (e.g., a farmer finds that purchased 
seeds were of poor quality during the harvest), and 
agents protect their rights, investments, and transac-
tions from the hazards of opportunism through means 
such as ex-ante efforts to find reliable counterparts and 
design efficient modes for partner commitments and 
ex-post investments for overcoming (monitoring, con-
trolling, stimulating cooperating)  possible opportun-
ism during contract execution (Williamson, 1996).  
In the agri-food sector, opportunism is widespread 
before signing insurance contracts (not disclosing in-
formation for possible risks) or during contract execu-
tion (not taking actions for reducing damages when 
events  occur  or  consciously  provoking  damages  in 
order to get insurance premiums). These events in-
crease the insurance prices and limit the utilization of 
insurance contracts by small enterprises. The insuree 
also “discovers” the insurer’s opportunism after the oc-
currence of a harmful event and finding that the assur-
ance terms (protected risks, extent of coverage, dam-Vizja Press&IT www.ce.vizja.pl
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ages assessments, costs) were not explained or adapted 
to the farmer’s needs. For many farm-related risks, the 
markets  evolve  slowly  or  the  insurance  services  are 
inaccessible to small operators. For some important 
risks, the insurance is not available “for purchase at all”, 
e.g., the risk of lack of market demand, price fluctua-
tions, opportunism of counterparts, etc. Farmers must 
develop other (private, collective) modes to safeguard 
investments and rights or lobby for public intervention 
in the assurance supply.
The  institutional  environment  (“rules  of  the 
game”) includes formal and informal rights and rules 
and system(s) of the enforcement of these rights and 
rules (North, 1990). Rights/rules are defined by laws, 
tradition, culture, religion, and ideological and ethical 
norms and enforced by state, convention, community 
pressure, trust, and self-enforcement. For instance, in 
many countries, some forms of risk governance are 
fundamental rights (on food, labor, eco-security/safe-
ty) and guaranteed by the state; public income sup-
port to farmers is “institutionalized”; standards (envi-
ronment, food safety) differ even between individual 
regions, etc. The (external) institutional environment 
considerably affects transaction costs. For example, in 
recent years, thousands of European enterprises closed 
because it was impossible to adapt to the newly intro-
duced EU standards for quality, safety, eco-preserva-
tion, animal welfare, certification, etc. 
Under conditions of stable and efficient public regu-
lation (rules, standards, price guarantees, quotas) and 
effective mechanisms for laws and contract enforce-
ment, preference is given to standard (spotlight, classi-
cal) contracts. When rights/rules are not well-defined 
or are changing and absolute/contracted rights are ef-
fectively enforced, primitive forms of risk management 
(subsistence farming, personalized and over-integrat-
ed forms) dominate and there is high vulnerability to 
diverse risks. The East European transition was charac-
terized by fundamental restructuring, “rule changes”, 
ineffective public enforcement, and high exposure to 
“new” (natural, market, entrepreneurial, private, con-
tractual, institutional, international) risks due to evolv-
ing  private  structures,  unsustainable  organizations, 
large gray economies, undeveloped or missing (credit, 
insurance, extension supply) markets, and individual 
(theft)  and  organized  (“security  service”)  risks  that 
devastated private businesses and household welfare. 
Dimensional characteristics of activities/transac-
tions include uncertainty, frequency, and asset speci-
ficity, which were identified as critical factors by Wil-
liamson (1996), and appropriability was later added by 
Bachev and Labonne (2000). When the recurrence of 
transactions between the same partners is high, then 
both sides are interested in sustaining and minimiz-
ing the costs of their relations (avoiding opportunism, 
sharing  risk,  building  reputation,  setting  incentive, 
adjustment,  conflict  resolution  mechanisms).  The 
continuation  of  relations  with  particular  partner(s) 
and the design of a special mode have high economic 
value,  and  the  development  costs  can  be  effectively 
recovered by frequent exchanges. When transactions 
are occasional, then the possibility for opportunism is 
great because the cheating side cannot be easily pun-
ished by turning to a competitor. 
When the uncertainty surrounding the transactions 
increases, then the costs for carrying/secure activities 
increases (overcoming information deficiency, assur-
ing risk). Bounded rationality is crucial, opportunism 
can emerge, and agents use special private forms for 
reducing transaction uncertainty such as the follow-
ing: trading with origins; providing guarantees; rent-
sharing or output-based compensation; collateral for 
credit;  input-supply  or  marketing  cooperative;  and 
complete integration. 
Transaction costs become very high when the spe-
cific assets for the relations with a particular partner 
are to be deployed. The costless alternative use of spe-
cific assets is impossible if transactions fail to occur, 
are prematurely terminated, or less favorable terms are 
renegotiated (before the end of the life-span of capital). 
Dependent investment/assets must be safeguarded by 
special forms such as long-term contracts, interlinks, 
hostage taking, joint investments, and quasi or com-
plete integration. Often, investments in specific capital 
are not made, and activity/transactions do not occur   
or occur without comparative advantages with respect 
to productivity. If there is a high symmetrical (risk, ca-
pacity, product, timing, location) assets dependency 
of transacting sides (a “bilateral trade” regime), then 
there are strong mutual incentives to elaborate special 
private modes (interlinking credit, inputs, insurance 
supply  against  marketing,  etc.).  Relational  contracts 
are applied when detailed terms of transacting are un-
known at the outset (high uncertainty), and framework 52 Hrabrin Bachev
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(mutual expectations) rather than the specification of 
obligations is practiced. Partners (self)restrict them-
selves from opportunism and are motivated to settle 
emerging difficulties and continue their relations (as in 
the situation of frequent reciprocal trades). When uni-
lateral dependency exists (unwanted “exchange”, quasi 
or full monopoly), then the dependent side must pro-
tect  their  investments  against  possible  opportunism 
(behavioral uncertainty/certainty) through integrating 
transactions  (unified  organization,  joint  ownership, 
cooperative) or by safeguarding them with interlinked 
contracts, exchanges of economic hostages, develop-
ment of collective organizations for price negotiations, 
lobbying for government regulations, etc. 
Activities/transactions  are  particularly  difficult 
when the appropriability of rights for behavior, prod-
ucts, services, and resources is low. The costs for pro-
tection, detection, verification, and third-party/court 
punishment  of  unwanted  exchanges  are  extremely 
high  (bounded  rationality).  Agents  either  over-pro-
duce (negative externalities) or under-organize activi-
ties (positive externalities) unless they are governed by 
efficient private or hybrid modes such as cooperation, 
strategic alliances, long-term contracts, trade secrets, 
or public orders.
Progress in science and technology significantly im-
proves risk management and facilitates the diversifica-
tion of forms, e.g., the introduction of new (resistant) 
plant and livestock varieties; the mechanization and 
standardization of operations and products; and the 
application  of  information,  forecasting,  monitoring, 
storage,  and  transportation  technologies  that  sig-   technologies  that  sig- technologies  that  sig-
nificantly improve risk management in the agri-food 
chain (COST, 2009; Hefnawy, 2011; Notarnicolaa et al., 
2012). However, modern applications of science and 
technology are also associated with production/expo-
sure to new types of risk, such as greenhouse gas emis-
sions, genetic contamination, natural resource deple-
tion, and over-dependence on technology.
Evolution  of  the  natural  environment  –  global 
warming, extreme weather, plant and animal diseases, 
drought, flooding and other natural disasters are pos-
ing new challenges for risk management in the agri-
food sector (Hefnawy, 2011; OECD, 2011).
The identification of “critical factors” of risk man- ” of risk man-
agement  decisions,  the  range  of  feasible  forms,  and 
the efficiency (costs, benefits) of governance modes 
for  individual  agents,  stages,  subsectors,  countries, 
food chains and public are subjects for special micro-
economic study. 
Comparative analysis is to be employed to compare 
the feasible forms and select the most efficient alter-
native that reduces the overall risk to an “acceptable” 
level and minimizes the total (risk assurance and gov-
ernance) costs. Most elements of risk governance ef- Most elements of risk governance ef-  ef-
ficiency are difficult to quantify, such as individuals’ 
characteristics, amounts of risk, levels of benefits and 
the costs associated with each mode. Th   e “measure- costs associated with each mode. Th   e “measure- ociated with each mode. Th   e “measure-  with each mode. Th   e “measure- The “measure-
ment problems” associated with the transaction ben-
efits and costs are well-specified (Bachev, 2011b) and 
prevent  the  utilization  of  traditional  (Neoclassical) 
models simply by adding a new “transaction” or risk 
management activity (Furuboth and Richter, 1998). 
Extended Qualitative (Discrete structural) analysis 
can be used as operationalized by Williamson (1981). 
For assessing the efficiency of risk governing struc-
tures, the features of risk to be managed (probability, 
significance, acceptance level, collective action needs) 
and  its  critical  (institutional,  technological,  behav-
ioral, etc.) factors are to be matched with comparative 
advantages (potential) of alternative modes to inform, 
stimulate  appropriate  behavior,  align  interests,  and 
overcome, reduce, control, share, dispute, and mini- and mini-
mize overall costs of risk. 
In a specific market, the institutional, technologi-
cal and natural environment effective risk governance 
choice  depends  on  a  combination  of  risk  features 
(probability of occurrence, likely magnitude of dam-
ages) and critical dimensions of activities/transactions 
(appropriability,  assets  specificity,  and  frequency), 
(Figure 2). High “standard” risks might be effectively 
managed  through  free  market  modes  such  as  stan-
dard/classical insurance, inputs supply, marketing, etc. 
contracts. Highly probable and damaging risks with 
a good appropriability and frequency of transactions 
between the same partners require a special (e.g. rela-
tional) contract. The later form is also appropriate for 
the risks surrounding with low uncertainty, high assets 
specificity and appropriability, and occasional charac-
ter of the relations between the counterparts. 
Principally, risks combined with high specificity, ap-
propriability and frequency might be effectively man-
aged though a vertical integration (internal risk man-
agement, contract forward or backward integration for Vizja Press&IT www.ce.vizja.pl
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risk sharing or mitigation). Highly likely and menac-
ing risks combined with a high assets specificity and a 
good appropriability call for a collective organization 
(cooperation, collective action). Moreover, such risk/
costs sharing organization could be easily initiated and 
maintained since the condition of a high risk and as-
sets dependency is in place.
However, serious transaction risk exists when assets 
specificity is combined with high uncertainty, low fre-
quency, and good appropriability. In that case, the elab-
oration of a special structure for private transactions 
is unjustified, specific (risk-reducing) investments are 
not made, and the activity/restriction of activity fails to 
occur on an effective scale (“market and contract fail-
ure”). Third-party (private, NGO, public) involvement 
is  necessary  (assistance,  arbitration,  regulation)  to 
make the transactions more efficient or possible. The 
unprecedented development of special origins, organic 
farming, and “fair-trade” systems are good examples; 
there are increasing demands (premium) for organic, 
original and fair-trade products associated with some 
forms of (natural, poverty, labor, quality) risk man-
agement, but their supply could not be met unless ef-
fective  trilateral  governance,  including  independent 
certification and control, is put in place. Similarly, for 
risks with a low appropriability a third party (public) 
intervention is necessary to secure the effective risk 
management. Moreover, while a high probability low 
danger risks need a collective organization assisted by 
a third-party (“quasi” public organization for risk shar-
ing and mitigation), the high damaging risks necessi-
tate a public organization. 
4. Stages in analysis and 
improvement of risk management
The analysis and improvement of risk governance in 
the agri-food chain is to include following steps: First, 
the existing and emerging threats and risks are identi-
fied. The persistence of certain risks is a good indica-
tor for ineffective management. Modern science offers 
quite reliable and sophisticated methods for assessing 
various risks to or caused by agri-food chain (DTRA & 
IIBR, 2011; Trench et al., 2011; Ueland et al.; 2012). 
Second, the existing and other feasible modes of 
risks  governance  are  specified,  and  their  efficiency 
and prospects of development are assessed. The effi-
ciency of individual modes shows their capability for 
risk detection, prevention, mitigation, and recovery at 
low costs, while sustainability reveals their ”internal” 
potential to adapt to socio-economic, technological, 
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and environmental changes and associated threats and 
risks. A holistic framework for assessing the efficien-
cy and evolution of governing modes is suggested by 
OECD (2011) and Bachev (2010). That stage identi-
fies the deficiencies of dominating (market, private, 
public) modes to solve existing and emerging risks, 
and determines the needs for (new) public interven-
tion.  For  instance,  when  appropriability  associated 
with transaction/activity is low, there is no pure market 
or private mode to protect against the associated risks. 
Respecting others’ rights or “granting” risk protection 
rights to others could be governed by “good will” and 
charity actions (e.g., the eco-sustainability movement 
initially  evolved  as  a  voluntary  activity).  However, 
voluntary initiatives can hardly satisfy entire social 
demands, especially if they require significant costs. 
The emergence of special large-member organizations 
for dealing with low appropriability to cover entire 
“social” risks is a very slow and expensive process, 
and it is unlikely to be sustainable in the long run (free 
riding). There is a strong need for third-party public 
intervention to make protection from risk possible or 
more  effective,  such  as  purely  public  organizations 
(public assurance for natural and economic disasters) 
or “quasi-public” modes (collective organizations as-
sisted/ordered by third parties) for high probability, 
low damage risks (Figure 2).
Third, the alternative modes for public interven-
tion to correct failures (market, private, public) are 
identified,  their  comparative  efficiency  is  assessed, 
and the best one(s) is selected. The comparative as-
sessment is to be made on (technically, economically, 
politically) feasible forms as mode(s) that minimize 
the total risk management (implementing and trans-
action) costs selected. The analysis is to take into ac-
count the overall private and social costs, including the 
direct and indirect (individual, third-party, tax payer, 
assistance  agency)  expenses,  and  private  and  public 
transaction costs. The latter costs often comprise a sig-
nificant portion of the overall risk management costs 
and are usually ignored; these costs include the costs 
for  coordination,  stimulation,  and  mismanagement 
of bureaucracy; individuals’ participation and use of 
public modes (expenses for information, paper work, 
fees, bribes); community control and reorganization 
of bureaucracy (modernization/liquidation of public 
modes), (opportunity) costs of public inaction, etc.
Initially, the existing/emerging problems (difficul-
ties, costs, risks, failures) in the organization of mar-
ket and private governance are specified. Appropriate 
pubic involvement is used to create an institutional 
environment for making private investments less de-
pendent, decreasing the uncertainty surrounding mar-
ket and private transactions, intensifying exchanges, 
and protecting private rights and investments such as 
when the State establishes and enforces quality, safety, 
and eco-standards, certifies producers, regulates em-
ployment  relations,  transfers  management  rights  on 
natural resources, etc., thus increasing the efficiency 
of market and private risk management.  
Next, the feasible modes for increasing appropri-
ability  are  considered.  Low  appropriability  is  often 
caused by unspecified or badly specified private rights 
and obligations. Sometimes, the most effective gov-
ernment intervention is to introduce and enforce new 
private and group (property) rights on diverse types 
of risks and trading; natural resources; food safety; a 
clean environment; tradable quotas for products, in-
puts, and emissions; intellectual property; and origins. 
That intervention transfers the organization of transac-
tions into market and private governance, liberalizes 
market  competition,  and  induces  private  incentives 
(investments) in certain risk management. 
In other instances, it is more efficient to establish 
public regulations for risk minimization for the utili-
zation of resources, products, and services (standards 
for labor, product, environmental safety); the intro-
duction  of  foreign  species,  GMC,  and  (water,  soil, 
air, comfort) contamination; bans on inputs, products, 
and technologies; regulations for trading ecosystem 
service protection; trade regimes; mandatory risk and 
eco-training, and licensing of operators, etc. 
In other instances, using incentives and restrictions 
of the tax system is the most effective method. Differ-
ent types of tax preferences are used widely to cre-
ate favorable conditions for the development of (sub)
sectors and regions, forms of organization, population 
segments, activity types. For example, environmental 
taxation on emissions or products (inputs, outputs) can 
be applied to reduce use or emissions of harmful sub-
stances; tax reduction can be used to overcome nega-
tive consequences of natural disasters, etc. 
In some cases, public support of private organiza-
tions is the best mode for intervention. Programs for Vizja Press&IT www.ce.vizja.pl
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modernization, enterprise adaptation, income support, 
environmental conservation, and public risk-sharing 
are common around the world. For instance, in the 
USA farm crop insurance has emerged as the most 
important farm program while insurance payments to 
farmers are the largest source of farm assistance (Zu-
lauf and Orden, 2012).
Often,  intervention that provides public  informa-
tion, recommendations, and training to farmers, en-
trepreneurs, residence, and consumers in risk manage-
ment is the most efficient method. 
In some cases, pure public organization (in-house 
production,  public  provision)  is  the  most  effective, 
and this type of organization includes critical infra-
structure; food safety inspections; research, education, 
and extension; agro-meteorological forecasts; border 
sanitary and veterinary control; recovery from natural 
catastrophes, etc.
Specific modes are effective if applied with other 
modes of public intervention. The necessity of com-
bined  intervention  is  caused  by  complementarities 
(joint effects) of individual forms; the restricted po-
tential of some less expensive forms to achieve cer-
tain (but not entire) socially preferred risk prevention/
mitigation; possible extra benefits (e.g., “cross-com-
pliance” requirements); specific critical dimensions of 
governed activity; risk and uncertainty (little knowl-
edge, experience) associated with the likely impacts of 
new forms; the administrative and financial capability 
of the State to fund, control, and implement different 
modes; and dominating policy doctrine.
The level of effective public governance depends 
on the type of risk and the scale of intervention. There 
are public involvements that are to be executed at the 
local (ecosystem, community, regional) level, while 
others require nationwide governance. There are other 
risk  management  activities  that  are  to  be  initiated/
coordinated at the international (regional, European, 
worldwide) level due to the strong necessity for trans-
border actions or consistent (national, local) govern-
ment  failures.  Often,  the  effective  management  of 
many risks requires multilevel governance with a sys-
tem of combined actions at various levels that involve 
a diverse range of actors and geographical scales.
Public  (regulatory,  provision,  inspecting)  modes 
must  have  built-in  mechanisms  for  increasing  the 
competency (decrease bounded rationality, powerless-
ness)  of  bureaucrats,  beneficiaries,  interests  groups 
and the public, and restricting possible opportunism 
(cheating, interlinking, abuse of power) by public of-
ficers  and  stakeholders.  This  increased  competency 
can  be  accomplished  by  training,  introducing  new 
assessment and communication technologies, increas-
ing transparency, and involving experts, beneficiaries, 
and interests groups in the management of the public 
modes at all levels. 
Generally, hybrid modes (public-private partnership) 
are more efficient than pure public forms because of 
their coordination, incentives, control, and cost-sharing 
advantages. The involvement of farmers, beneficiaries, 
and interest groups increases efficiency, decreases in-
formation asymmetry, restricts opportunisms, increases 
incentives for co-investment, and reduces management 
costs. For instance, the enforcement of most labor, ani-
mal welfare, and eco-standards is often very difficult or 
impossible. Stimulating and supporting private volun-
tary actions are much more effective then mandatory 
public modes in terms of incentive, coordination, en-
forcement, and disputing costs.  
If there is a strong need for third-party public in-
volvement but effective (government, local authority, 
international assistance) intervention in risk manage-
ment is not introduced in a timely manner, then sig-
nificant risks to individuals and public persist while 
agrarian “development” is deformed. 
Dealing with many risks  in  the  agri-food  sector/
chain requires multiform, hybrid, multilevel, and trans-
national intervention, and the appropriate governance 
mix is to be specified. 
Comparative  analysis  can  improve  the  design  of 
public  intervention  for  specific  conditions  of  food-
chain  components  in  a  particular  country/region  in 
terms of increasing security and decreasing costs. The 
suggested approach also can predict likely cases of 
(new) public failures due to the impossibility of mobi-
lizing political support and resources or the ineffective 
implementation of otherwise “good” policies. Public 
failure is feasible, and its timely detection enables risk 
managers to foresee the persistence/increase of certain 
risks and inform local and international communities 
about the consequences.
Risk management analysis is to be made at differ-
ent levels - individual components (input supply, farm, 
processing, transportation, distribution), regional, sub-56 Hrabrin Bachev
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sector, food-chain, national, and international, accord-
ing to the types of risks and scales of collective actions 
necessary to mitigate risks. It is not a one-time exer-
cise to complete the last stage with a perfect system 
of risk management. Rather, it is a permanent process 
to improve risk management along with the evolu-
tion of the socio-economic and natural environment, 
individual and community awareness, modernization 
of technologies, etc. Moreover, public (local, national, 
international) failure often prevails, which also brings 
us into the next cycle in the improvement of risk man-
agement. 
For the application of this suggested approach, in 
addition to the traditional (statistical, industry, etc.) in-
formation, new types of data are necessary for diverse 
risks and forms of governance, critical factors for each 
agent, and levels of benefits and costs. Such data are 
collected  through  interviews  with  agri-food  chain 
managers, stakeholders, and experts in these areas. 
5. Contemporary opportunities and 
challenges for risk governance in the 
agri-food chain
Modern  agri-food  chains  involve  millions  of  actors 
with  different  interests,  multiple  stages,  and  diverse 
risks requiring complex, multilateral, and multilevel 
governance on a large scale. For instance, there are 
several million farmers, several hundred thousand dif-
ferent food processors and retailers, and 500 million 
consumers in the EU. The figures are much larger if the 
total number of global agents who are involved in the 
EU agri-food chain are taken into account.
The variety of existing and emerging threats and 
risks (natural, technological, behavioral, etc.) in the 
modern agri-food chains are identified (DTRA & IIBR, 
2011; Humphrey and Memedovic, 2006; OECD, 2011). 
Diverse market and private modes evolved to address 
specific risks driven by ethics, competition, consumer 
demand, business initiatives, trade opportunities such 
as  direct marketing, voluntary and industry standards, 
insurance schemes, guarantees, fair-trade, trade with 
brands, origins, and organic and quality products. Dif-
ferent bilateral and multilateral private forms are used 
widely to safeguard against risks, explore benefits, and 
facilitate exchange such as clientalisation, contractual 
arrangements, cooperation, and complete backward/
forward integration. Special trilateral forms emerged 
to enhance security and the confidence of partners and 
consumers, including independent (third-party) certi-
fication and inspection. Trade internationalization is 
increasingly associated with collective private actions 
(standards, control mechanisms) on transnational and 
global scales (e.g., GLOBALGAP). Property (securi-
ty/safety) rights modernization and market and private 
“failures” brought about the needs and modes for pub-
lic interventions (assistance, regulations, provision) as 
the scope and stringency of publically imposed rules 
expand constantly to embrace new products, methods, 
dimensions (human, animal, plant, eco-health), haz-
ards (GMC, nanotechnology, terrorism), and informa-
tion requirements. Furthermore, the globalization of 
exchange and threats/risks increasingly require setting 
transnational public order (ISO, WHO, FAO, WTO). 
For example, there are common (traceability, precau-
tion,  communication)  principles  (food,  veterinary, 
phytosanitary,  feed,  environmental  etc.),  legislation, 
and  implementing  and  enforcing  agencies  (EFSA, 
ECDC, ECHA) for the agri-food chains and imports 
in the EU. 
Consumers’  concerns  about  food  safety  risks 
have increased significantly after major food safety 
“events”/crises in recent years (avian flu; mad cow 
and foot-and-mouth diseases; poultry salmonella; con-
tamination of dairies, berries, and olive oil; natural and 
industrial disasters, etc.). For example, since 2005 the 
number of respondents “worrying about food-safety 
problems” in the EU increased, and as many as 48% 
of European consumers (in Bulgaria, approximately 
75%) indicated that consumed food was “very or fairly 
likely” to damage their health (Eurostat, 2010). 
There are a number of (new) opportunities for risk 
governance in the agri-food chain (Figure 3): First, 
advances and dissemination of technical food chain, 
training and risk management methods (microbiologi-
cal, genetic, electrical, laser, robotic, immunological, 
chemical  and  biosensor,  nanotechnology,  ICT  etc.), 
integral  and  food  chain  approaches,  and  research, 
monitoring, testing, decision making, and forecasting 
capabilities for risk-detection, assessment, prevention, 
and mitigation (COST, 2009; Trench at al., 2011). For 
instance, advances in detection, assessment, and miti-
gation methods and technologies associated with bio-
logical and chemical risks are presented by DTRA & 
IIBR (2011). Vizja Press&IT www.ce.vizja.pl
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Second,  modernization  and  international  harmo-
nization  of  institutional  environments  (private,  cor-
porate, collective, NGOs, public food-safety and re-
lated standards, rules, enforcements). For instance, EU 
membership improves considerably the “rules of the 
game” in new member states; market access rules and/
or “corporate responsibilities” induce transformations 
in the agri-food sector of exporting countries in Africa, 
Latin America, and Asia.
Third, considerable development of specialization of 
activities (including risk taking, monitoring, manage-
ment) and concentration of (integral) management in 
food-production, processing, servicing, and distribution 
allowing centralized innovation and enforcement; time, 
scale, and scope economies; and easy third-party con-
trol. For instance, the market share of the three largest 
food retailers comprise between 27 and 91% in the EU 
states (Eurostat, 2010), and food safety training, certi-
fication, inspection, and information are large interna-
tional businesses (Humphrey and Memedovic, 2006).
Fourth, quasi or complete integration of the con-
secutive or dependent stages in food chains are cre-
ating mutual interests and effective, long-term means 
for risk perception, communication, and management. 
For  example,  in  Bulgaria  the  (raw)  milk  supply  is 
closely integrated by (dairy) processors through on-
farm (collecting, testing) investments and interlinks 
(inputs, credit, and service supply against milk deliv-
ery) contracts with smallholders, while dairy market-
ing is managed by branding (standards, bio labels) and 
long-term contracts (Bachev, 2011a). 
Fifth, the increasing consumer “willingness to pay” 
for food safety attributes such as chemical and hor-
mone bans, safety and inspection labels, and original 
and special products (Trench at al., 2011). The latter 
justify and make economically possible the pay back 
of costs for special governance. 
Sixth, the growing involvement of consumers (rep-
resentation, organizations) and media and the national 
and transnational (information, technical, managerial, 
training,  certification)  cooperation  of  partners  and 
stakeholders are improving the options available to 
agents, inducing public and private actions, and en-
hancing risk management communication, efficiency, 
and speed. 
Modern developments are also associated with a 
number of (new) challenges for risk governance in the 
agri-food chain: i) Emergence of new threats, risks, 
and uncertainty associated with the evolution of the 
natural  environment  (climate  change,  water  stress, 
“new” plant, animal and human hazards) as well as 
new human-induced economic, financial, food securi-
ty and safety, water, environmental etc. crises, on large 
(transnational, global) scales.
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System of 
risk
governance 
New opportunities 
- advances in technical methods, 
approaches, capability 
- modernization and harmonization 
of institutional environment 
- specialization of activity and 
concentration of management 
- integration of consecutive and 
dependent stages 
- consumers’ “willingness to pay” 
for food-safety attributes 
- consumer and media involvement 
- national and transnational  
cooperation 
New challenges 
- new threats/risks (evolution of 
nature, economies, demands, inputs, 
technologies, products, governance, 
exchange; adversary, terrorist attacks) 
- separation of risk-creation from risk-
taking (dependencies, externalities) 
- mass production, distribution, 
consumption vulnerability 
- high adaptation and compliance costs 
- unequal norms, implementing 
capability, policies, private strategies  
- (national/international) public failure  
- informal/gray agri-food sector 
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ii)  Increasing  new  threats,  risks,  and  uncertainty 
connected with inputs, technologies, and product dif-
ferentiation and innovation. For example, the Fuku-
shima nuclear accident severely affected the agri-food 
sector in Japan and beyond, and there are uncertainties 
associated with the growing application of nanotech-
nologies and GMCs, etc. (Eurostat, 2010).
iii) Increasing specialization and concentration of 
activity and organizations which separate “risk cre-
ation” (incidents, ignorance, opportunisms) and risk 
taking  (unilateral  dependencies,  quasi-monopolies, 
spill-overs, externalities). Thus, risk assessment, pric-
ing, communication, disputing, and liability through 
(pure)  market  and  private  modes  are  very  difficult 
and  costly.  For  instance,  cheating,  misleading,  and 
pirating are common in food chain relations, includ-
ing high information asymmetry, detection, disputing, 
and punishment costs. It is indicative that for food 
risk information, consumers in the EU place greater 
trust in “health professionals”, “family and friends”, 
“consumers associations”, and “scientists” rather than 
“food producers” and “supermarkets and shops” (Eu-
rostat, 2010). 
iv) Widespread mass production, distribution, and 
consumption  increase  the  vulnerability  of  the  agri-
food chain expanding scope and severity of natural, 
incidental, opportunistic, criminal, and terrorist risks. 
For instance, in Europe there is a growing number of 
official notifications based on market and non-mem-
ber country controls, food poisoning, consumer com-
plaints, company self-checks, border screenings, and 
rejections (Eurostat, 2010).
v)  Increasing  adaptation  and  compliance  costs 
(capital,  training,  certification,  documentation,  etc.) 
for rapidly evolving markets and institutional environ-
ments that delay or prevent the reformation of small 
farms and food chain enterprises (Trench et al., 2011; 
Bachev, 2010). For instance, in Bulgaria, the adap-
tation of dairy and meat processors to EU standards 
continued for 10 years, and two-thirds of them ceased 
to exist before the accession of their country (Bachev, 
2011a).
vi) Public and private food quality and safety stan-
dards, and the efficiency of their enforcement, differ 
considerably between industries, countries, and regions 
(Humphrey and Memedovic, 2006). That is result of 
unequal norms (GAPs, formal and informal rules) and 
implementing  and  enforcing  capability,  or  deliberate 
policies, or private strategies (e.g., multinationals that 
sell the “same” products with different quality in differ-
ent countries). “Double/multiple standards” are respon-
sible for exchange inequality and dissimilar threats and 
risks exposure of individual agri-food systems.
vii) Wide spread “public failures” in food chain 
(risk) management such as bad, inefficient, delayed, 
or  under/over  interventions;  gaps,  overlaps,  infight-
ing,  and  contradictions  among  different  agencies 
and rules; high bureaucratic costs; and unsustainable 
costs and underfunding. For instance, the Bulgarian 
Food Agency  was  established  after  a  5-year  delay; 
the Acquis  Communautaire  are  still  not  completely 
implemented (capability deficiency, mismanagement, 
corruption); and trust of the EU rather than national 
institutions prevails (Bachev, 2010). There are also nu-
merous instances of international assistance or gover-
nance failures when institutions are “imported” rather 
than adapted or designed for specific local conditions 
(Bachev, 2010).
viii) Production, marketing, and consumption tradi-
tions, high food or governance costs, and deficiencies 
of will and capacity are responsible for the persistence 
of the high risk informal/gray agri-food sector around 
the globe without effective control and substandard, 
fake, and illegitimate products and activities. For in-
stance, only one-third of Bulgarian dairy farms com-
ply with EU milk standards, only 0.1% possesses safe 
manure pile sites, and half of the milk production is 
consumed by the producer at home, exchanged or di-
rectly sold (Bachev, 2010). 
ix)  Multiplying  new  threats  and  risks  associated 
with  adversary  (competitor)  and  terrorist  attacks, 
and emerging governing and exchange forms (street 
sales; internet, phone and mail order sales; shopping 
trips). These risks all require specific/non-traditional 
risk management methods and modes such as guards, 
policing, intelligence, multi-organizational and trans-
national cooperation, etc.
Conclusion
We  have  demonstrated  that  governance,  along  with 
technical, information and other issues, play a central 
role in risk management analysis and design. The entire 
spectrum of diverse types of threats and risks (natural, 
market, health, criminal, policy etc.), specific (natural, Vizja Press&IT www.ce.vizja.pl
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technological, and often neglected behavioral, dimen-
sional, and institutional) factors, and the comparative 
benefits and costs (including commonly ignored third-
party costs, transaction costs, and time) are to be taken 
into account in assessing efficiencies, complementari-
ties and prospects of all feasible and alternative (mar-
ket, private, public, hybrid) modes. We suggest the use 
of discrete structural analysis to  match the features of 
a risk to be managed (such as probability, significance, 
acceptance level, and collective action needs) and its 
critical  (institutional,  technological,  behavioral,  etc.) 
factors with the comparative advantages of the alterna-
tive modes to inform, stimulate appropriate behavior, 
align interests, and overcome, reduce, control, share, 
dispute, and minimize the overall costs of risk. 
Moreover,  the  system  of  risk  management  is  to 
adapt/improve by taking advantage of the summarized 
new opportunities and overcoming/defending against 
evolving new challenges. We have demonstrated that 
more hybrid (public-private, public-collective) modes 
should be employed given their coordination, incen-
tive, control, and cost advantages. (Pure) public man-
agement of most agri-food-chain risks is difficult or 
impossible  (agents’  opportunism,  informal  sectors, 
externalities).  Often,  the  introduction  and  enforce-
ment of new rights (food security, risk-management 
responsibility) and supporting private and collective 
initiatives (informing, training, assisting, funding) are 
much more efficient. 
Finally, we argue that greater support must be given to 
multi and inter-disciplinary research on (factors, modes, 
impacts of) risk governance in the agri-food chain in or-
der to provide effective support to national and interna-
tional policies, the design of modes for public interven-
tions, and individual, collective and business actions.
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